Tax Audits Evaluation

09 December 2020

12.30 - 16.30 GMT

Tax administrations rely on audits as a tool to promoting and enforcing tax compliance. But, how effective are audits in enhancing compliance? Do they deter or enhance tax noncompliance? Do they affect subsequent tax payment behaviour by the audited taxpayers? Does their impact vary depending on the audited tax base (VAT/CIT/PIT)?

Besides this direct specific deterrence effect on audited taxpayers, audits may also have an indirect (general) effect on taxpayers that did not experience an audit. This raises the issue regarding the extent to which audits affect compliance behaviour of those taxpayers who belong to the network of the audited taxpayer.

Recently tax administrations started to rely on different types of tax enforcement examinations including correspondence or desk based audits and issue related audits in addition to the more traditional face-to-face or comprehensive audits, but little is known of their impact.

These are some of the important issues this TARC workshop addressed. Speakers included Brian Erard, Jason DeBacker (University of South Carolina), and Christos Genakos (Cambridge University and AUEB) among others.

Speaker presentations can be downloaded by following the links below:

Workshop Programme

12.30 - 13.00: Do Think Twice, it´s Alright: Effects and Mechanisms of Tax Enforcement Policies

Oddbjørn Raaum; Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Norway

13:10 - 13:40: A framework for the evaluation of preemptive tax administration policies‌

Alessandro Santoro, Università Bicocca Milano, Italy

13:50 - 14:20: You've Got Mail: The Specific Deterrence Implications of Increased Reliance on Correspondence Audits

Brian Erard, B. Erard & Associates, USA

14:40 - 15:10: Do CIT Audits Deter Non-Compliance? Preliminary Evidence from Rwanda‌

Luca Salvadori, TARC & University of Exeter - Business School

15:20 - 15:50: Professional Advice: The Effects of Tax Preparers on Compliance‌

Jason DeBacker, University of South Carolina, USA